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As the dust settles on the intergenerational transfer of power accom-plished by the Chinese Communist Party after protracted factionalstruggles and intense behind-the-door bargaining, the clamour for
political reform is growing louder yet. Critics have looked back upon the
last decade presided over by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao with disappointment.
Study Times editor Deng Yuwen penned a damning critique listing ten grave
problems (shida wenti 十大问题) as the pair’s political legacy (zhengzhi
yichan政治遗产), stating that the problems engendered in the past decade
may well outweigh the achievements. (1) Writing in Foreign Affairs, Damien
Ma blames the administration for leaving behind “a political environment
that is likely more corrupt and stifling than the relatively entrepreneurial
and liberal era of the 1990s.” (2) China Watcher David Shambaugh describes
Hu as “an arch-conservative, cautious, risk-averse, stability-obsessed appa-
ratchik.” (3) Gao Wenqian, senior advisor of Human Rights in China, goes fur-
ther in suggesting that the departing president’s “greatest political legacy
is stability maintenance with an iron fist.” (4)
Indeed, weiwen, the shorthand for stability maintenance in Chinese (weihu
wending 维护稳定), has become closely associated with the suppressive
governance approach of the Hu-Wen administration and the drastic expan-
sion of the political-legal and public security apparatus that took place
under its supervision. First used by Deng Xiaoping and injected into the of-
ficial discourse with its coming-of-age appearance in the headline of Peo-
ple’s Daily – “Stability above all” (wending yadao yiqie 稳定压倒一切) – on
the first year anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the currency
of the term wending has coincided with major social conflicts such as the
1999 nationwide campaign against members of the outlawed Falun Gong. (5)
But it was from the mid-2000s onwards, in the 17th Party Congress era in
tandem with Hu’s slogan of building a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui
和谐社会), that weiwen visibly gained in rhetorical ascendance and evolved
into an overarching national priority.
The connotation of the term has since grown irreversibly negative as the
security-driven state employed high-handed means of violence against its
own citizens in the name of preserving stability. The Chongqing fallout, and
the subsequent exposure of the excesses of Bo Xilai and his security aide
Wang Lijun’s strong-fisted campaigns, has nonetheless created an excep-
tional window of opportunity for reining in the burgeoning power of the
political-legal apparatus and for critical re-examination of the enshrined
weiwen approach. As we enter the 18th Party Congress era, are we looking
at any signs of change? This paper suggests that despite hints of reform, re-
cent appointments show that the central elite remains preoccupied with
stability concerns and that resistance to change remains strong at both the
central and local levels of government. The apparent scaling back of the po-
litical-legal apparatus has been accompanied by the parallel rise of the social
management regime, which may become a reinvented form of social con-
trol. There are nonetheless encouraging signs towards reforming institutions
of violence complicit in disciplining “misbehaving” citizens, but meaningful
change would require fundamental reform in how successful governance is
defined and measured.
Weakened political-legal apparatus?
The announcement of the new line-up of the Politburo Standing Com-
mittee (PSC) in November 2012 concluded months of speculation with a
list of names that ultimately thwarts the hopes of reformists. Not only are
the relatively liberal Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao not in the top seven, but
many in the new PSC enjoy close ties with former president Jiang Zemin,
demonstrating the triumph of political conservatism and the influence of
Party elders. Nonetheless, one important indication of progress can be found
in the reduction of the size of the PSC from nine to seven members, which
has meant the effective downgrading of the internal security portfolio. The
Secretary of the Central Politics and Law Commission, or the zhengfawei
(政法委), will no longer serve on China’s top decision-making organ but only
share a seat on the Politburo with 24 other members. This demotion, to say
the least, represents “a very big rebuke” to former security tsar Zhou
Yongkang, who had significantly expanded his law enforcement empire dur-
ing his five-year reign. (6)
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The powerful zhengfawei, in addition to being in charge of the Ministry
of Public Security (i.e. the police), the Ministry of State Security (i.e. the se-
cret police), the Procuratorate, and the courts, exercises control over the
people’s militia and the People’s Armed Police (i.e. paramilitary force re-
sponsible for civilian policing) while also overseeing “unofficial” security
forces such as citizen informants hired by local governments. (7) A recent
Yanhuang Chunqiu report shows that it has not always enjoyed such sweep-
ing powers. During the 1980s there were clear attempts by reformists to
limit its functions, and for a period after 1988 the zhengfawei was replaced
by a much weaker Politics and Law Leading Small Group (zhengfa lingdao
xiaozu 政法领导小组). (8) After Tiananmen, however, the zhengfawei was re-
vived for obvious reasons and underwent its first round of empowerment
in the early 1990s. (9) The need to purge Falun Gong became the pretext for
the further strengthening of the weiwen machine in 1999, when the Leading
Small Group for Stability Maintenance Work (zhongyang weiwen gongzuo
lingdao xiaozu 中央维稳工作领导小组) was established. (10)
When Zhou Yongkang took charge of the zhengfawei in 2008, China was
experiencing its “first peak” (diyige langjian 第一个浪尖) in the number of
mass incidents (quntixing shijian 群体性事件). (11) To extend the reach of his
power, Zhou set about constructing a nationwide, full-coverage security in-
frastructure by establishing weiwen offices at all levels of government, even
down to the county and township levels. (12) Powerful dynamics kept the
monolithic system running. The assessment and promotion of officials was
adjusted in such a way that the ability to preserve stability became a key
criterion in performance evaluation. (13) The introduction of the “one-ballot
veto” (yipiao foujue 一票否决) policy means that cadres who fail to main-
tain stability can be punished even if they boast excellent records in eco-
nomic performance. (14) The skewed logic of “smoothing things out shows
competence; getting things done means stability; zero incident demon-
strates ability”(baiping jiushi shuiping, gaodingjiushi wending, meishi jiushi
benshi 摆平就是水平、搞定就是稳定、没事就是本事) generates strong in-
centives that predispose officials to use any means available to stamp out
unrest at its first signs (loutou jiuda 露头就打) in order to secure career ad-
vancement. This suppressive approach has inevitably led to the perverse
outcome of exacerbating tensions and inciting more disruptive protests.
Despite its apparent inefficacy, not to mention the significant cost to cit-
izen’s rights and the rule of law, both local and central governments have
developed interests in the system’s continued operation. For local officials,
in addition to political achievements (zhengji 政绩), there are financial re-
wards to be reaped. The purported need to contain “threatening” individuals
such as activists allows local security bureaus to come up with bigger budg-
ets and demand special earmarked funds. For example, before his escape,
the “expenditure” of putting blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng under house
arrest was 60 million yuan in 2011 alone and involved more than 100 local
police and cadres. (15) The sum was granted to the township government
where Chen was held as a one-off transfer from the county, with multiple
layers of interests deriving monetary benefits in between. (16) Weiwen there-
fore brings in good money for local officials: arrests and detentions are made
if only to keep the resources coming. The central government, for its part,
can keep its hands clean by delegating the use of violence to local security
forces. Should any violent acts against citizens be exposed, the central gov-
ernment can conveniently evade responsibility and indeed burnish its up-
right image by bringing punishment upon malfeasant local officials. (17)
Public opposition to stability maintenance has strengthened over the
years. In 2010, the social development research group under the Depart-
ment of Sociology of Tsinghua University published a first detailed academic
report that presents a systematic critique of the skewed logic of weiwen
(weiwen beilun 维稳悖论) and the vicious cycles it engendered. (18) Adopting
the unassuming title “Institutionalise interest representation to realise long-
term social stability,” the 30-page report is a concerted attempt by a group
of scholars including Sun Liping, Shen Yuan, and others to draw attention
to the dangers of “pursuing stability regardless of cost” (buxi daijia zhiqiu
wending 不惜代价、只求稳定). The campaign-style approach (yundongshi
zhili 运动式治理) to stability preservation, which relies on a rigid model of
vertical command and political mobilisation (chuizhi mingling zhengzhi
dongyuan 垂直命令、政治动员), has resulted in the substitution of unbri-
dled power in place of the law (yiquan daifa 以权代法). This rampant disre-
gard for the rule of law has contributed directly to the present condition of
social deterioration to the worrying point of collapse (shehui kuibai 社会溃
败). The symptoms of imminent collapse, the scholars warn, are already here:
executive power slipping out of control (xingzheng quanli shikong 行政权
力失控); complete lack of restraint for interest conglomerates (qiangshi liyi
jituan siwu jidan 强势利益集团肆无忌惮); penetration of dark and evil forces
in localities (difangwei hei’eshili suo shentou he kongzhi 地方为黑恶势力所
渗透和控制); and severe corrosion of social justice (shehui gongping zhengyi
zaoshou yanzhong qinshi 社会公平正义遭受严重侵蚀).
The unbearably high cost of weiwen borne by local governments has also
drawn widespread criticism. Decrying the “black hole” of the astronomical
cost of weiwen (tianjia weiwen de wudidong 天价维稳的无底洞), a Guang-
ming Ribao columnist noted that in many localities, weiwen expenses now
equal or have exceeded the amount spent on social welfare. (19) In
Guangzhou, 4.4 billion yuan was spent on stability preservation in 2007
compared with the 3.52 billion yuan devoted to social security. (20) The sit-
uation is particularly dire in poorer inland regions, where local governments
subject to high fiscal pressure are forced to cut back on welfare programs.
In March 2012, weiwen expenses made headlines as public security spend-
ing was to increase by 11.5 percent to 700 billion yuan, compared with a
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defence budget of 670 billion yuan. (21) Analyst He Qinglian estimates that
at least 80 percent of this is expected to fund organs of state-sanctioned
violence, with the majority going to public security departments and the
paramilitary police. (22)
Critics also attack the flawed logic underlying the suppressive approach
to stability preservation. Lawyer Chen Youxi argues that the weiwen gov-
ernmentality mistakenly treats citizens as enemies of the state and as the
ignorant mass (buming zhenxiang de qunzhong 不明真相的群众), and hence
adopts Machiavellian (quanmoushi 权谋式) methods that do not attend to
the roots of popular discontent. Chen also criticises the superstitious faith
in police power (mixin gongquanli 迷信公权力 ) as naïve and short-
sighted. (23) Critic Xia Nan similarly attacks the perverse drive to achieve ab-
solute stability (dui juedui wending de bingtai zhuiqiu 对绝对稳定的病态追
求). To Xia, the overriding imperative to “resolve conflicts at the bottom-
most level” (ba maodun huajie zai jiceng 把矛盾化解在基层) contributes
directly to the worrying normalisation of abusive tactics in the training of
grassroots officials to the point of moral insensitivity. (24)
The purging of Bo Xilai and the reappraisal of his dahei (打黑) campaigns
in Chongqing have opened a window for more of such dissenting views. Vic-
tims’ accounts of the abuses they suffered as a result of unchecked power
in Chongqing provided a strong basis for calls for reform. (25) In May, a group
of veteran Communist Party members wrote to Hu Jintao urging the sacking
of Zhou Yongkang. (26) Hu’s work report at the 18th Party Congress and the
White Paper on Judicial Reform released in October 2012 also offer hopeful
signs of greater emphasis on the rule of law. (27)
Reinventing social governance
The extent of actual change, however, remains unclear. On the positive
side, the downgrading of the zhengfawei secretary position implies an un-
ambiguous curtailment of the power of Zhou  Yongkang’s successor,
Meng Jianzhu. Meng is no longer “his own judge,” as he will “have to answer
to someone” in the PSC. (28) There are also rumours that the Ministry of State
Security may be taken from the zhengfawei structure and be placed under
the control of the State Council, a move that would certainly weaken Meng
further. (29)
At the regional level, signals are more mixed. On the one hand, there ap-
pears to be a retrenchment of zhengfaiwei power. As of January 2013, only
seven heads of provincial public security bureaus serve concurrently as the
provincial zhengfawei secretaries. (30) On the other hand, new regional chief
appointments still demonstrate preference for officials with weiwen expe-
rience. Wang Rulin and Xia Baolong, recently promoted from governor to
provincial Party secretary of Jilin and Zhejiang respectively, had both worked
as provincial zhengfawei secretary previously. (31) Even the records of so-
called new stars of “sixth-generation” leaders are patchy at best. Hu Chun-
hua, the 49-year-old new Party secretary of Guangdong  Province, was
previously the party chief of Inner Mongolia, where he was recognised for
the “successful” quelling of ethnic protests by Mongol minorities. His trans-
fer to Guangdong has raised suspicion that Beijing is prepared to introduce
a more strong-handed approach in disciplining the wilful province. 
Looking ahead, one notable development is the renewed emphasis on so-
cial management (shehui guanli 社会管理). The phrase leapt to widespread
attention after Hu Jintao’s speech in February 2011, in which he called for
the innovative construction of a “socialist social management system with
Chinese characteristics” to “ensure a harmonious and stable society.” In the
same year, the Central Commission for Comprehensive Management of Pub-
lic Security (Zhongyang shehui zhi’an zonghe zhili weiyuanhui中央社会治
安综合治理委员会) was renamed the Central Commission for Comprehen-
sive Social Management (Zhongyang shehui guanli zonghe zhili weiyuanhui
中央社会管理综合治理委员会), in short the zongzhiwei. The renaming was
accompanied by an expansion of the zongzhiwei apparatus by the addition
of 11 new subdivisions, such that the organ now boasts 51 departments.
According to Century Weekly, many provinces have in the past year raised
the agency’s profile by making their provincial Party secretaries or deputy
Party secretaries the chairs of the zongzhiwei. (32) At the municipal level,
there are cases in which the Party secretary and the mayor serve as dual
heads the zongzhiwei (shuangzhurenzhi 双主任制). 
In the official rhetoric, social management is to bring about a more serv-
ice-oriented approach in governance that stresses neighbourhood building
(shequ jianshe 社区建设) and the fostering of social organisations (shehui
zuzhi 社会组织). Nonetheless, as Sebastian Veg observes, the empowerment
of society, instead of entailing a relaxation of control, may in fact signal a
transition to a new style of governance in which “carefully vetted non-gov-
ernmental structures are employed to pull certain sectors of society into
the orbit of the state, and then ultimately outsource control of society to
them.” (33)
Notably, the reinvigorated zongzhiwei enjoys close ties with the zhengfawei
and its subsidiaries. In many localities the two organs share the same staff
and offices (heshu bangong 合署办公). The practice of top “first-in-com-
mand” officials (yibashou 一把手) holding leadership positions across several
departments is ubiquitous. Before the regional chief reshuffle, in Hebei, Anhui,
and Yunnan provinces the zhengfawei head serves as the concurrent chief of
public security and the zongzhiwei. In other localities, it is not uncommon
for public security chiefs, high people’s court presidents, the procurator-gen-
erals, and even military personnel to serve concurrently as deputy directors
of the zongzhiwei. The zongzhiwei thus enjoys broad cross-departmental
powers in the Party, the government, and the military, useful, no doubt, for
“organisation and coordination” (zuzhi xietiao 组织协调) of efforts to “max-
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imise factors conducive to harmony and minimise those detrimental to
it.” (34) In light of the delegitimisation of the zhengfawei and the public se-
curity apparatus, the rise in stature of the zongzhiwei and the growing cur-
rency of social management as the new political jargon are noteworthy and
raise the important question of whether they serve as a reinvented form of
social control. (35)
Reforming institutions of repression
The 18th Party Congress era may also see progress in reforming some in-
stitutions of violence operating at the bottom of the production chain
(chanyelian 产业链) of weiwen. These institutions, legal or extralegal, serve
the specific function of helping local governments take deviant individuals
– petitioners, protest participants, human rights activists – off the streets
in order to preserve social order. This paper discusses three of these institu-
tions, namely the re-education through labour system, the mental health
institutions, and the nationwide network of black jails, and evaluates recent
attempts towards bringing these institutions under the rule of law.
Re-education through labour
One of the most notorious institutions in the stability maintenance ap-
paratus is the re-education through labour (laodong jiaoyang 劳动教养)
system, commonly known as laojiao. Modelled after the Soviet Gulag, the
system was initially established in the mid-1950s to incarcerate those ar-
rested in the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (zhenya fange
ming yundong 镇压反革命运动) that took place in the early 1950s. (36) It
was soon used by Mao Zedong to confine opponents during the Anti-Right-
ist Movement (fanyou yundong 反右运动) and to detain criminal offenders.
The arbitrary regulations turned the system into a convenient instrument
for local units from communes to production brigades. The number of those
receiving labour reform increased from 36,983 in 1957 to almost 500,000
in 1960. (37) The use of laojiao declined during the Cultural Revolution, but
the institution was vigorously revived, expanded, and indeed legalised
through a series of notices and regulations announced in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. There has since been “a vast explosion in the number of
offenses that can lead to laojiao,” as the system was deployed against
democracy protesters after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, practitioners
of Falun Gong and other religious groups, and those who resisted the one-
child policy. (38)
Today, the laojiao system can place a person behind bars for three years
without trial and in some cases four if the person is considered “insuffi-
ciently re-educated.” (39) A United Nations Human Rights Council report es-
timated in 2009 that there were some 190,000 Chinese held in 320
re-education centres nationwide. A Ministry of Justice expert put the figure
at 60,000 as of January 2013, in addition to 200,000 former drug addicts. (40)
Conditions within laojiao centres, managed by the Ministry of Justice, are
notoriously poor and condemned by some as “essentially unmonitored
sweatshops” where inmates are reportedly forced to work 12-hour shifts
doing heavy construction work for private developers. (41)
With heightened emphasis on stability maintenance, laojiao is now sys-
tematically used against petitioners and activists. With the police in charge
of imposing sentences, the system provides “a handy tool for dispensing
punishment without intrusions by lawyers or judges,” allowing local gov-
ernments to take a large number of “trouble-makers” off the streets conve-
niently. The most controversial case recently involved Tang Hui from Hunan
Province, the mother of an 11-year-old girl who was kidnapped, raped, and
sold into prostitution by seven men. Tang was sent to laojiao for 18 months
for repeatedly petitioning local authorities to bring harsher punishment
upon the perpetrators. She was released within a week after her case drew
widespread attention online. Another widely publicised case involved 25-
year-old former village official Ren Jianyu, who was given a two-year laojiao
sentence for spreading “negative comments and information” on the Inter-
net and for mocking Bo Xilai’s red campaign as a return of the Cultural Rev-
olution. (42) Ren was released nine months early, but the lawsuit he filed
against the Chongqing Laojiao Committee to defend his innocence was re-
jected. (43)
The call to reform the disputed system came to the forefront before the
18th Party Congress meetings. In October 2012, Jiang Wei, the official in
charge of the Central Leading Small Group for Judicial Reform, announced
that the authorities had “reached a consensus” on the necessity to reform
the system, in particular the approval procedure in which authorities decide
if a person should receive laojiao. In January 2013, Xinhua and other gov-
ernment mouthpieces reported that Meng Jianzhu, the new zhengfawei sec-
retary, will explore the possibility of abolishing laojiao within this year. In
fact, pilot testing of a replacement system called “education and correction
of violations” (weifa xingwei jiaoyu jiaozhi 违法行为教育矫治) already
began in August in the cities of Nanjing, Lanzhou, Zhengzhou, and Jinan. (44)
It remains to be seen whether this substitute – reportedly a smaller-scale
variant with more reasonable procedures – represents something funda-
mentally different or merely “a deceptive name change.” (45) Indeed, it is not
the first time that laojiao reform has been put forward since its reinstall-
ment. Proposals to abolish the system had emerged as early as the
mid 1980s. In 2003, seven members of the Guangdong committee of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference proposed experimenting
with abolition in the province. By 2007, at least 420 representatives of the
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National People’s Congress had tabled proposals to change the disreputable
system. (46) Abolishing the system will entail a redistribution of power and
will likely weaken the public security apparatus. Whether sufficient momen-
tum has finally been gathered for substantive change remains to be seen.
Mental health institutions
One definite step towards tighter oversight has been made in the area of
mental health institutions. On 26 October 2012, China adopted the coun-
try’s first Mental Health Law (jingshen weisheng fa 精神卫生法) in an ex-
plicit attempt to address the disturbingly prevalent phenomenon of healthy
individuals being declared mentally ill and committed to psychiatric facili-
ties for political reasons (bei jingshenbing 被精神病). According to news
portal Caixin, at least 300,000 people were forcibly sent to mental hospitals
in 2008. (47) These institutions are seen not merely as medical institutions,
but troublingly also as disciplinary and law enforcement bodies targeting
disturbers of social order. Other than the health and civil affairs depart-
ments, the police department is also responsible for operating mental
wards. (48) The Ministry of Public Security operates its own infamous system
of Ankang Hospitals (ankang yiyuan 安康医院), where no court order is re-
quired for committal. (49)
The practice of politically motivated psychiatric custody has been in ex-
istence since the early 1950s as China learnt from the network of Special
Psychiatric Hospitals operated by the Soviet Union’s Ministry of the Inte-
rior. (50) In the 1990s, attention was drawn to the secretive operation as
Human Rights Watch accused China of using it against Falun Gong members
and political dissidents. Nowadays, according to a database compiled by a
Chinese human rights organisation, petitioners are the most frequent vic-
tims. In one revealed case, repeated petitioning was even put down as the
sole cause for confinement. (51) The conspicuous lack of unified regulation
on mental facilities means that hospitals are free to draw up their own rules,
resulting in rampant abuse of inmates using medical means, including ex-
treme dosages of medication, injections, and application of electrically-
charged acupuncture needles. In a case reported by the New York Times,
farmer Xu Lindong was locked up for more than six years, during which he
received 54 electric-shock treatments in addition to routine injections of
powerful drugs. His initial “crime” was repeated filing of complaints against
the local government over a land dispute. (52) Another man in Hubei Province
was confined to a mental ward for nearly 14 years for exposing corruption
in the government. (53)
Drafting of the Mental Health Law began as early as 1985, but it was only
in June 2011 that the first draft was issued. (54) The draft contains several
highly contentious provisions. (55) For example, Articles 26 and 27 allow in-
dividuals who are suspected of having mental illness to be involuntarily
committed when they exhibit behaviour that threatens public security (wei-
hai gonggong anquan 危害公共安全) or disturbs public order (raoluan gong-
gong zhixu 扰乱公共秩序). (56) Article 24 empowers close relatives to send a
suspected mentally disabled family member to the hospital, which makes
them vulnerable targets of external pressure. While this latter article remains
unchanged in the final version (as Article 26), the passed law does introduce
tighter regulations to prevent involuntary committal, including granting pa-
tients the right to ask for re-evaluation by a qualified psychiatrist of their
choice if they do not agree with the initial diagnosis. Individuals can also
lodge lawsuits against the government or medical institutions if their legal
rights have been harmed.
It is unclear whether this step forward by the central government will be
implemented at the local level. As of 2010, only six out of 283 cities have
a local mental health ordinance. (57) Local authorities appear undeterred in
using mental health as a tactic to spot potentially “unstable” individuals.
The South China Morning Post reported in October that community health
centres across Shanghai were given orders to conduct psychiatric surveys
in which local residents were asked to identify persons in their neighbour-
hoods who fight with others, talk in riddles, speak or laugh to themselves,
or show odd facial expressions. Talking too much, meddling in others’ affairs,
and being cold towards others are also marked as signs of mental instabil-
ity. (58) Activist Wan Yanhai noted similar developments in Zhejiang Province,
and expressed concern for “a troubling return to the climate of suspicion”
experienced during the Cultural Revolution, when neighbours were encour-
aged to report on one another. (59) These latest developments are poignant
reminders that laws passed at the national level remain fragile and irrelevant
at best when local governments have little incentive for their implementa-
tion.
Black jails
A third network of extrajudicial institutions that has expanded significantly
in the 2000s is the operation of unlawful detention facilities commonly
known as black jails (heijianyu 黑监狱) or black houses (heifangzi 黑房子).
Like labour camps and mental hospitals, black jails are used to take unde-
sirables off the streets and limit destabilising activities. Specifically, they
target petitioners who make their way to provincial capitals and Beijing
from different parts of the country in the hope of presenting their grievances
before higher-level authorities. As a larger number of petitioners signals a
weaker ability on the part of local officials to resolve conflicts within their
jurisdiction, which adversely affects their career prospects, local officials
employ “interceptors” to abduct petitioners en route to or at the capital. (60)
These interceptors, usually thugs hired by security companies, hold peti-
tioners captive at secretive locations such as hostels and abandoned sites
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until they received notice to send them back home. (61) Such extralegal ac-
tivities intensify and reach their peak every year during the Two Meetings
(lianghui 两会) of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Po-
litical Consultative Conference. (62)
Ironically, one direct cause for the recent growth of black jails is the abolition
of the arbitrary Custody and Repatriation (shourong qiansong 收容遣送) pro-
cedure, a vagrancy detention system complemented by 700 official shourong
centres nationwide that allowed the police to arrest, detain, and repatriate
any citizen on the streets without a local hukou (户口) registration. (63) In 2003,
the outpouring of public outrage over the tragic death of migrant student
Sun Zhigang as a result of abuse at a shourong centre in Guangzhou forced
the central government to abolish Custody and Repatriation. The closure of
facilities did not effectively bridle the police’s acquired powers of arbitrary
detention, however, but merely prompted the proliferation of extralegal black
jails and drove outlawed practices underground. Since 2003, the operation of
black jails has evolved into a lucrative business sustained by intertwined
chains of interests. In one uncovered case, the private security firm Anyuand-
ing has expanded significantly since its launch in 2004, attracting more and
more clients “including even remote village governments.” (64) Local officials,
intent on eliminating any disruptions that may jeopardise their political ca-
reers, are willing to hire thugs, commonly known as retrievers (jiefangrenyuan
截访人员), to abduct petitioners, paying as much as US$250 for each person
successfully captured. Black jail operators, on the other hand, receive daily
cash payments from local governments for each detainee, with a different
charge imposed for urban and rural petitioners. (65)
Despite irrefutable evidence, officialdom has remained staunchly in denial
of the existence of black jails. When challenged by overseas media, the For-
eign Ministry spokesperson replied with a curt “Things like this don’t exist
in China.” (66) To maintain the official silence, exposed cases were either
quickly censored or declared isolated incidents. (67) In the 2010 Anyuanding
case, two executives were arrested but later released without charge. The
Beijing police even raided the office of Caijing magazine as a retributive
punishment for reporting the story. (68) More recently, in December 2012,
Xinhua and People’s Daily reported on a Beijing court sentencing ten people
to jail for illegally detaining and assaulting a group of petitioners from
Henan, but the reports were mysteriously taken down by the end of the
day. (69)
In an unusual turn of events, it was reported that on 6 December 2012,
hundreds or even thousands of petitioners were released from one of Bei-
jing’s largest black jails. That this unexpected move took place on Rule of
Law Promotion Day was seen by some as a sign that the new Xi-Li leader-
ship is resolved to curb illegal imprisonment. (70) The earlier approval by
China’s legislature in March 2012 of amendments to the Criminal Procedure
Law, however, offers a less optimistic view. Despite measures to strengthen
the rights of suspects, including the prohibition of the use of violence in ob-
taining evidence and compulsory taping of interrogation procedures, the
newly revised law contains a provision that effectively allows individuals to
be kept away from home in secret locations for an unspecified amount of
time. The controversial Article 73, dubbed “disappearance clause” or “KGB
clause,” confers power on law enforcement agencies to detain those sus-
pected of involvement in cases related to corruption, terrorism, or “national
security” – which has in the past been interpreted loosely to include acts
such as criticising the government. (71) According to the revised law, family
members must be notified within 24 hours, but this protection does not
apply if they cannot be reached or, arbitrarily, when it is deemed that noti-
fication hinders investigations. (72) The incorporation of Article 73 into the
revised law, as Human Rights Watch’s Nicholas Bequelin suggests, solidifies
the supremacy of the security state and demonstrates that hard-line and
conservative elements within the Party remain strong. (73)
Whither weiwen?
Bringing substantive reform to the above institutions of violence would re-
quire, at the very least, a fundamental change in the standards of cadre eval-
uation. For local governments, all three institutions serve as convenient means
to reduce the number of troublemakers and maintain outward social stability.
As long as these objectives continue to dominate career advancement con-
siderations, local officials will have a strong incentive to resort to such arbi-
trary and extralegal measures in order to secure political achievements.
Reform at the level of national legislation without correcting the perverse in-
centive structure is likely to prove ineffective. However, the central leadership,
as we have seen, also benefits from such an arrangement as it allows them
to avoid responsibility for violent clampdowns by making scapegoats of its
local agents. Hence, bidding farewell to the weiwen governmentality would
require new thinking on governance on the part of Beijing.
Right now, there are signs that weiwen will turn into a more insidious form
of control that, by entering the world of the press and the Internet, is able
to cut off attempts to organise collective actions before they reach the
streets. According to one estimate, the city of Beijing is currently spending
some 40 million yuan a month on stability maintenance on the blogosphere
(wangluo weiwen 网络维稳), and boasts a 2 million strong team of Internet
commentators (wumao 五毛). (74) Earlier in March 2012, the authorities
made the controversial move of launching real-name registration for mi-
croblogs (weibo). Netizens must register their real names, and in some cases
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submit their personal IDs and telephone numbers, before they are allowed
to create posts. (75) In December 2012, the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences published the Blue Book of China’s Society 2013, which draws atten-
tion to the power of the mobile Internet in mobilising citizens. In a rare
reference to Hong Kong, the report mentions the large-scale civic move-
ment against national education, which, it says, “was rather unexpectedly
instigated by three high school students through Facebook.” (76) In light of
the “impulsive and radical behaviour” of some mainland young people in
anti-pollution and anti-Japanese demonstrations, which have caused “anx-
iety and controversy in the society,” the report calls on the government to
more tightly supervise online public opinions in order to realise weiwen. (77)
Strengthening Internet regulations is also called for to target “irresponsible
rumours” on the Internet (bu fuzeren de yaoyan 不负责任的谣言), although
the report does praise the recent online campaign against corrupt officials
(wangluo fanfu lüjian qigong 网络反腐屡建奇功). (78)
It remains to be seen whether the new administration headed by Xi Jinping
and Li Keqiang will heed such advice and move towards a stricter regime of
stability maintenance in the media. The Nanfang Zhoumo incident at the
beginning of the year, deemed “the first big political scandal of 2013,” is a
distressing reminder of the pressure to which the media continue to be sub-
ject. (79) The burden is on Xi to bring about genuine change in the 18th Party
Congress era.
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